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Towards a Multilateral Agreement
on Investment
Dr. Rainer Geiger*
Introduction
In May 1995, the Paris-based Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) launched negotiations for a Multilateral Agreement
on Investment (MAI). These negotiations were unprecedented in scale. For
the first time a group of countries accounting for the bulk of international
investment sought to develop a comprehensive set of rules on investment
liberalization, investment protection, and dispute settlement.1 The MAI
negotiations have generated enormous public debate on the impact of for-
eign investment and the challenges of globalization. To provide a more
thorough discussion of outstanding issues of the MAI, the OECD Council
of Ministers announced on April 28, 1998, "a period of assessment and
further consultation between the negotiating parties and with interested
parts of their societies."2
This Article discusses the rationale and objectives of the MAI and
responds to concerns raised in public debate.
I. Rationale and Objectives of the MAI
Since the 1960s, rapid expansion of international investment has accompa-
nied slow but steady progress in the development of an international
framework of rules for investment.3 The OECD played a pioneering role in
this development. The OECD's Codes of Liberalisation of Capital Move-
ments and Current Invisible Operations (Capital Movement Codes) paved
the way to the removal of capital account controls and other obstacles to
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1. Most foreign direct investment (FDI) is still occurring in the OECD area. Only a
very small percent of total world capitalization exists in the developing countries and
emerging markets, while a majority of global FDI has gone to industrialized countries.
See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD), FOREIGN
DIREcT INVESTMENT AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: LESSONS FROM SIX EMERGING ECONO-
MIES (1998).
2. OECD, Ministerial Statement on the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI)
(Apr. 28, 1998) <http://www.oecd.org/news-andevents/release/nw98-50a.html> [here-
inafter Ministerial Statement].
3. For an overview of developments in the international law on investment, see R.
GEIGR, UN CADRE MULTILATfRAL DE VLINVEsTIssEMENT, LE ROLE DE L'ETAT DANs LE DEVEL-
OPMENT DE L'ECONOMIE 552 (1997).
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international services transactions. 4 The Capital Movement Codes were
supplemented in 1976 by the Declaration on International Investment and
Multinational Enterprises, a modification that balanced national treatment
of foreign controlled enterprises on the one hand, and standards for inves-
tor behavior on the other.5 In 1983, the OECD Capital Movements Code
was further amended to provide foreign investors the right of establishment
in Member countries. By 1995, almost all exchange controls on capital
accounts and most horizontal restrictions on foreign investment (i.e.
authorization procedures for all categories and sectors) had disappeared
within OECD member countries.
During the mid-1970s, the Conference on International Economic
Cooperation (CIEC) recognized the need for an open investment climate
based on transparent, stable, and equitable rules. Eight developed and
nineteen developing countries (the European Community member coun-
tries were represented by a single delegation) 6 participated in the CIEC
from December 1975 to June 1977.7 The principles recognized by the
CIEC were developed in greater detail in the 1992 World Bank Guidelines
on Treatment of International Investment, which received universal
recognition.8
Around the same time, a dense network of bilateral investment protec-
tion agreements had developed among industrialized countries and devel-
oping countries. Several initiatives used a regional approach: the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Energy Charter Treaty
(ECT) succeeded in setting high standards for the treatment of foreign
investment. 9 A global approach was also adopted: the General Agreement
on Trade in Services (GATS), which entered into force on January 1, 1995,
as part of the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements, covered
investment as international services transactions.1 0
Building on these achievements, the proposed MAI seeks to consoli-
date and to innovate. The MAI will consolidate all disciplines relating to
international investment and effective dispute settlement. It will innovate
by introducing new disciplines and integrating labor, environmental, and
other societal concerns into the agreement.
Thus, the MAI is conceived to be:
- state-of-the art: building on the highest standards of treatment con-
tained in current bilateral, regional and sectoral agreements;
4. See OECD, Introduction to the OECD Codes of Liberalisation Ouly 3, 1998) <http:/
/www.oecd.org/daf/cmis/codes/codes.htm>.
5. OECD, OECD Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enter-
prises (July 3, 1998) <http://www.oecd.org/daf/cmis/codes/declarat.htm>.
6. See THE Amn-u'c INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, EUROPE AND THE NORTH-
SOUTH DIALOGUE 74-78 (Wolfgang Wessels ed., 1978).
7. See id.
8. See Foreign Investment Law Journal, vol. 7/2, 1992, ICSID, Washington, D.C.
9. See LEGAL COUNSEL, INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, THE ENERGY CHARTER TRv
16-18 (1995).
10. For a detailed analysis, see URSULA KNAPP, THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN
SERvIcEs (GATS): AN ANALYSIS 7-8 (OECD Working Papers No. 85, 1994).
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- comprehensive: covering all categories of investment (direct as well as
portfolio), all sectors and activities of enterprises, all phases of the invest-
ment process (before and after establishment, privatization, and de-monop-
olization), and applying obligations to all levels of government (federal,
provincial, regional, and local);
-evolutionary: setting a framework for progressive liberalization while
respecting the regulatory authority of signatory countries and protecting
important national interests;
- balanced: recognizing societal interests such as labor standards and
environmental protection, and highlighting the responsibilities of multina-
tional enterprises to behave as good corporate citizens in their host
countries;
- open: developing a free-standing international treaty open to all
countries willing and able to assume its obligations.
These principles are reflected in the key provisions of the draft
agreement.'1
IL Key Elements of the MAI
A. Progressive Liberalization
The MAI is aimed at promoting an open international investment climate,
removing obstacles to the crossborder flow of capital, and facilitating the
establishment of enterprises. The key disciplines are national treatment,
most favored nation (MFN) treatment, and transparency.
National treatment means that foreign controlled enterprises can
expect, in like circumstances, treatment no less favorable than that
accorded to domestic investors. This implies equality of competitive condi-
tions for foreign enterprises already established in the country and access
to investment opportunities for non-resident enterprises. The MFN treat-
ment safeguards the multilateral character of the agreement. As a matter of
principle, preferential regimes among participating countries or reciprocity
requirements based on a bilateral exchange of concessions are contrary to
this principle. Transparency means that rules, regulations, and administra-
tive practices applying to investment and business activities in the country
should be clear, predictable, and published.
The MAI aims to avoid discrimination. It does not intend to create
uniform investment conditions in participating countries. Each member
remains free to determine the conditions under which business can be con-
ducted in its territory. Multinational, as wel as domestic, enterprises are
subject to the laws and jurisdiction of the countries in which they operate.
To avoid misunderstandings, the regulatory sovereignty of participating
countries is explicitly stated in the Ministerial Declaration of April 28,
1998.12
11. The consolidated text of the MAI is available at <http://www.oecd.org/daf/cmis/
maindex.htm>.
12. Ministers confirm that the MAI must be consistent with the sovereign
responsibility of governments to conduct domestic policies. The MAI would
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National treatment and MFN are comparative standards: they apply in
like situations. Thus, the special circumstances of each investment are
taken into account. This means, for instance, that countries are not
expected to extend programs designed to promote small and medium sized
enterprises or regional development to big multinational enterprises that
do not meet the criteria of these programs.
The MAI will not require the instantaneous dismantling of non-con-
forming measures, but will allow for general or country-specific excep-
tions. General exceptions will apply to cover measures taken for essential
national security interests. The MAI will likely contain a general exception
for public order, subject to control for abuse. Generic solutions will also
apply in areas where concerns are shared by the vast majority of participat-
ing countries. Thus, prudential measures taken to maintain the stability of
the financial system will be considered to be in conformity with the MAI.
Measures taken in favor of ethnic minorities or in the health and education
sector may also be exempted from the liberalization disciplines of the MAI.
The MAI could also reference the commitments concerning regulated
service industries entered into by participating countries under the GATS.
In other words, signatories of the GATS would not be required to assume
additional obligations on market access and national treatment. This solu-
tion would protect the interests of countries that wish to maintain preferen-
tial treatment for their national cultural industries, especially audiovisual
services.
In addition to the solutions outlined above, participating countries
will have the possibility of lodging country-specific exceptions to protect
non-conforming measures. Such exceptions are subject to review by the
other participating countries and the Negotiating Group to ensure an
acceptable balance of commitments among contracting parties. The
regime of these exceptions will be governed by a few key principles:
- top-down approach: the obligations apply to all sectors and categories
of measures not specifically covered by country exceptions;
- standstill: no new restrictions can be entered after the conclusion of
the agreement and liberalization measures, which once introduced,
become irreversible;
- rollback: countries are committed to submit to periodic reviews of
their exceptions or participate in future rounds of negotiations with a view
to extending the level of liberalization. Such periodic reviews operate by
peer pressure but cannot impose new obligations on any country without
its consent.
establish mutually beneficial international rules which would not inhibit the
normal non-discriminatory exercise of regulatory powers by governments and
such exercise of regulatory powers would not amount to expropriation.
Ministerial Statement, supra note 2, 1 5.
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B. Protecting Existing Investment
Compared with national treatment and MFN, which are relative standards
and subject to exceptions, the investment protection provisions of the
agreement will provide absolute guarantees to existing investment, particu-
larly in the areas of expropriation and compensation, transfer of benefits,
and repatriation of capital. These provisions constitute a multilateral codi-
fication of standards already contained in bilateral agreements, regional
agreements, and customary international law.
Recently, the question was raised as to whether general regulatory
measures that do not deprive an enterprise of the title of property can be
considered as equivalent to expropriation. While it is generally accepted
that government action depriving an owner of the substance of its prop-
erty, even without transfer of legal title, can amount to expropriation, the
negotiators of the MAI have stated that regulatory acts of general applica-
tion should not normally be considered an expropriation. This statement
is consistent with legal practice and jurisprudence in most, if not all, par-
ticipating countries. 13
C. Effective settlement of investment disputes
Investors greatly value the availability of effective procedures for quick set-
tlement of claims against governments arising from alleged violations of
international obligations. Recourse to arbitration is provided by the 1968
Washington Convention on the International Settlement of Investment Dis-
putes, most bilateral investment treaties, NAFTA, and the ECT. Under the
WTO, dispute settlement is limited to state-to-state procedures.
The MAI dispute settlement process will, in principle, apply the state-
to-state and investor-state procedures to all obligations. Investors' direct
recourse to arbitration will increase legal certainty and add credibility to
the MAI. Investors will also avoid potential political conflicts; they no
longer have to depend on their home governments to espouse their claims
because the MAI provides a private cause of action. However, limitations
have been proposed to protect participating countries' sovereign interests.
Some negotiators believe that investor-state proceedings should not be
available to challenge government decisions on the conditions of entry and
establishment of foreign investment. Environmental organizations are con-
cerned about a chilling effect on governmental protection of the environ-
ment, resulting from investor claims that environmental regulation
amounts to expropriation. This issue can best be resolved through appro-
13. A general definition of expropriation and similar measures is contained in the
Agreement on the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency. See Multilateral Invest-
ment Guarantee Agency, Oct. 11, 1985, 24 I.L.M. 1605, T.I.A.S. No. 12,089, at 7.
Expropriation and similar measure: any legislative action or administrative
action or omission attributable to the host government which has the effect of
depriving the holder of a guarantee of his ownership or control of, or a substan-
tial benefit from, his investment, with the exception of non-discriminatory meas-
ures of general application which governments normally take for the purpose of
• regulating economic activity in their territories.Id.
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priate drafting of the expropriation provision together with an interpreta-
tive statement that the exercise of general regulatory powers does not
normally amount to expropriation.
Investor-state proceedings may raise important questions of interpre-
tation of the agreement, and the decision of an arbitral panel may set a
precedent for future application of the agreement. Therefore, it has been
suggested that interested third parties, including governments, citizen
groups, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), be given the right to
intervene before the panel or at least submit written statements. To ensure
coherence of interpretation, an appeals procedure has been proposed.
Some critics argue that the MAI gives foreign investors a right to chal-
lenge government measures through dispute settlement, putting foreign
investors in a better position than domestic enterprises. However, domes-
tic enterprises can resort to national courts in a familiar legal environment.
Another criticism is that dispute settlement is not available to governments
wishing to sue investors. But host states enjoy the full force of their own
law and can use government authority and their judicial system to take
action against both domestic and foreign investors operating within their
territory.
D. Societal Interests and Investors' Responsibilities
The MAI cannot be expected to provide a uniform set of rules for business
activities. It is not intended to supersede national legislation or specific
international agreements on matters such as competition, intellectual prop-
erty rights, health and consumer protection, labor standards, industrial
relations, or environmental protection. In other words, the MAI is not a
constitution for the world economy, but is simply one important element
of a broader international framework.
However, a foreign investment framework has undeniably wide effects
on the physical, social, and economic development of individual countries.
Multinational enterprises can bring substantial benefits and act as motors
of economic development. The introduction to the OECD Guidelines rec-
ognized that "the complexity of these multinational enterprises and the dif-
ficulty of dearly perceiving their diverse structures, operations and policies
sometimes give rise to concern." 14
Investment is a means to care for the interests of present and future
generations. Investment rules and disciplines should not hinder but rather
promote sustainable development. Negotiators have broadly agreed on
four elements to reflect societal interests in the MAI:
- placing into the preamble a strong reference to sustainable development,
internationally recognized core labor standards and environmental
protection;
- affirming the contracting parties' right to regulate to ensure that invest-
ment activity is undertaken in a manner sensitive to health, safety, and
14. OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: Text (Dec. 17, 1998) <http://
www.oecd.org/daf/cmis/cime/mnetext.htn>.
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environmental concerns provided that such measures are consistent
with the agreement;
- prohibiting parties to the agreement from lowering health, safety, envi-
ronmental, or labor standards to attract an investment;
- annexing the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises to the
MAI.15
Since 1976, the OECD Guidelines have formed part of a balanced
approach to international investment by Member countries. Although
legally non-binding, the Guidelines express a firm expectation of govern-
ments in the behavior of multinational enterprises. They contain chapters
concerning general corporate policies, disclosure of information, competi-
tion, taxation, employment and industrial relations, science and technol-
ogy, and, since 1991, environmental protection. Despite some problems
experienced by certain Member countries, the Guidelines have enjoyed
support from business and trade unions and have proven to be an effective
tool in promoting responsible conduct by enterprises in their respective
countries.
The Guidelines are accompanied by follow-up procedures at both the
national and international levels, which allow problems to be raised. The
OECD Committee on International Investment and Multinational Enter-
prises is empowered to issue clarifications of the meaning of the Guide-
lines in specific circumstances. 16 InJune 1998, the Committee decided to
review the Guidelines to assess past problems and recommend any neces-
sary revisions of substantive provisions and procedures.
Attaching the Guidelines to the MAI will not affect the non-binding
nature of the instrument and will enhance its political appeal. MAI parties
will automatically adhere to the Guidelines and participate in their imple-
mentation. At the same time, the Guidelines will preserve the parties' flexi-
bility as changes in the text can be introduced by consensus of all parties
without recourse to lengthy treaty amendment procedures.
IlI. Perspectives of the MAI
Negotiating parties have drafted texts and are considering further propos-
als concerning all of the above elements. In addition, the treaty is likely to
contain provisions extending its disciplines to privatization, de-monopoli-
zation, and concessions. A rather complicated article of the MAI deals with
performance requirements, essentially prohibiting issues that have a dis-
torting effect on trade and investment flows. Outstanding issues include:
an economic integration proposal that would protect the harmonization
and mutual recognition of laws among members of the European Union;
the scope of general and country-specific exceptions; conflicting require-
ments; and secondary investment boycotts arising from the extraterritorial
application of national measures. Solutions to these issues have been iden-
15. See Environment and Labor in the MAI: Chairman's Proposals, March 1998 (Aug.
11, 1998) <http://www.oecd.org/daf/cmis/mai/labenv.htm>.
16. See OECD, THE OECD GuIDELiNus FOR MULTINATIONAL ENERPmSES 18 (1994).
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tified and could be implemented rapidly in the concluding phase of the
negotiations.
The last Ministerial Declaration did not set a deadline for resolution,
but it is obvious that failure to move forward on the remaining critical
issues would be fatal to the MAI. The negotiators will also have to decide
the political feasibility of the agreement in light of the reaction of their
constituencies and the ongoing public debate.
During the last twelve months, the MAI has been targeted by an inter-
nationally orchestrated campaign designed to stop or at least delay the
agreement. In hindsight, the participating governments made a mistake in
negotiating within tightly set deadlines without exposing key concepts of
the agreement to public debate at an early stage. However, in a representa-
tive democracy, society is represented by elected governments. Treaty mak-
ing powers lie with the executive branch of government, and parliaments
make the final decision in the ratification process.
Negotiations were not conducted in secrecy. Ministers, not bureau-
crats, decided to launch the process. Public information was available
early in the process, and business and trade unions were informed and
consulted through their advisory bodies at OECD. Non-member countries
were aware of the MAI negotiations through regular briefings after each
meeting of the Negotiating Group and were consulted through regional
meetings held in Latin America, Asia and Africa.17 Eight non-Member
countries have joined the negotiations as observers and have obtained full
access to all the proceedings of the Negotiating Group. 18
It is true that public debate picked up relatively late after drafts of the
agreement had been put on the internet, first by non-government organiza-
tions (NGOs), then by the OECD and the negotiating partners themselves.
A first meeting between the Negotiating Group and NGOs representing
environmental and consumer concerns held in October 1997 was benefi-
cial because it helped identify critical issues and improved the draft of the
agreement. At the same time, discussion on the MAI raised consciousness
of the benefits and risks of globalization. The OECD Secretariat conducted
an environmental assessment of the MAI and a study on its compatibility
with multilateral environmental agreements. 19 The benefits of trade and
investment liberalization were the subject of another OECD study pub-
lished in Spring 1998.20 The MAI was discussed in Spring 1998 at an
OECD meeting of environment ministers and the annual high-level meeting
of the Development Assistance Committee. A high-level advisory group on
17. For an example of the published proceedings of one regional seminar, see
OECD, INVESTMENT POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND MULTILATERAL RULES ON INVESTMENT
(1997).
18. The following countries participate as observers in the MAI Negotiating Group:
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Estonia, Hong Kong, China, Latvia, Lithuania, and the Slovak
Republic. See Ministerial Statement, supra note 2.
19. See OECD, Relationships Between the MAI and Selected Multilateral Environmental
Agreements (MEAs) (Mar. 13, 1998) <http://www.oecd.org/daf/cmis/mai/meaenv.htm>.
20. See OECD, OPEN MARKETS MATTER: THE BENEFITS OF TRADE AND INVESTMENT LIBER-
ALIZATION (1998).
Vol. 31
1998 Towards a Multilateral Agreement on Investment
the environment discussed the potential of the MAI from the perspective of
sustainable development. 21
Although some of these studies have been critized and the discussions
remain controversial, the result is a more informed public debate on the
challenges of globalization. Even the strongest critics of the MAI no longer
contest the need for a multilateral investment agreement even if they sug-
gest alternative processes and rules.22 Beyond ideologies, there is now
room for a substantive debate.
Conclusion: What, then, are the conditions for a successful MAI?
The MAI must be friendly to business, provide stable conditions and legal
certainty for long term commitment of resources, ensure broad coverage,
and set the stage for further liberalization.
The MAI must be friendly to labor, encourage the development of
human resources, support core international labor standards, and prevent
the lowering of standards as an incentive for investment.
The MAI must be friendly to the environment and promote sustaina-
ble development.
The MAI must encourage dialogue with all interested countries and
offer a real partnership for shaping the future.
These elements are already in place, and the agreement which is
emerging today is more balanced and more realistic than earlier blueprints.
The MAI has the potential to make a decisive contribution to an equitable
international framework of rules and better practices for the 21st Century.
The MAI, therefore, merits strong support.
21. See OECD, The Report of the High Level Advisory Group on the Environment to the
Secretary General of the OECD, Guiding the Transition to Sustainable Development: A Crit-
ical Role for the OECD (Nov. 25, 1997) <http://www.oecd.org/subject/sustdev/
hlage.htm>.
22. See Council of Canadians, Towards a Citizens' MAI (July 1998) <http://
www.canadians.org/citizensmai.html>.

